

NORTH REGION HEALTHCARE COALITION MEETING

JANUARY 16TH, 2025

**Virtual Sign-in
Sheet**



**NORTH HCC Leaders:
Steven Sarinelli & Thomas Calimano**

**Clinical Advisor:
Dr. Ammundeep Tagore**

Agenda

- Welcome
- NJCICC Presentation
- Clinical Advisor Presentation
- Coalition Updates
- Coalition Discussions
- Member Updates
- Technical Support Reminder and Upcoming Meetings
- Closing Remarks



New Jersey Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cell



Clinical Advisor Updates




A close-up, low-angle shot of a vehicle's tire tread on a dirt road. The tire is the central focus, showing a rugged, blocky tread pattern. The background is blurred, showing a dirt road and some foliage. The overall tone is dark and gritty.

Vehicle as a Weapon (VAW) Attacks

Ammundeeep Tagore MD

New Year's Day Ramming in New Orleans

- Ford Truck used as VAW
- 15 Killed
- 35 Injured



History of Attacks

- 1973 [Olga Hepnarová](#) case, Czechoslovakian woman using a truck to go on a rampage; 8 dead, 12 injured.
- 1983 [Douglas Crabbe](#) drove a 25-tonne [Mack truck](#) into the crowded bar of a motel at the base of [Uluru](#) on 18 August 1983. Five people were killed, and sixteen were seriously injured.
- 1999 [Shimonoseki Station massacre](#) (ramming and stabbing)
- [2001 Azor attack](#) (8 dead, 26 injured)
- 2004 Colorado USA [Marvin Heemeyer](#), aka KillDozer attack (severe property damage, perpetrator dead by suicide)
- [2006 UNC SUV attack](#), 22 year old Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar intentionally hit people with an SUV (no deaths, 9 injured)
- [2008 Jerusalem front-end loader attack](#) (3 killed, 30 injured)
- [2008 Jerusalem BMW attack](#) (19 injured)
- [2009 attack on the Dutch royal family](#) (ramming people, attempt to attack the Dutch royals including the reigning monarch; 8 killed)
- [2011 Tel Aviv truck attack](#)(1 dead, 17 injured)
- [2013 Tiananmen Square attack](#) (5 dead, 38 injured)
- [2014 Isla Vista killings](#) (vehicle ramming, stabbing, and shooting attack)
- [2014 Dijon attack](#), France (ramming people)
- [2014 Nantes attack](#), France (ramming people)
- [2014 Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu ramming attack](#), Quebec,Canada. (1 killed, 1 severely injured)
- 2014 [October 2014 Jerusalem vehicular attack](#) (one child, one adult killed,7 injured)
- 2014 [November 2014 Jerusalem vehicular attack](#) (3 dead, 13 wounded)
- [2014 Jerusalem tractor attack](#) (1 killed, 7 injured)
- [May 2014 Ürümqi attack](#) (43 dead, 90+ injured)
- 2015 [Saint-Quentin-Fallavier attack](#), France (ramming people, stabbing and bombings; 1 killed, 2 injured)
- 2015 Weifang attack (ramming people). 5 dead, 21 injured
- 2015 Shuozhou attack (ramming people)
- [2016 Nice truck attack](#), France (86 killed, ramming people and gunfire).
- [January 2017 Melbourne car attack](#), Australia, (6 killed, 28 injured, 1 stabbed before).
- [2017 Jerusalem truck attack](#) (4 dead, 17 injured)
- [2017 Finsbury Park van attack](#) (1 dead, 11 injured)
- [2017 Westminster attack](#) (6 dead, 48 injured)
- [2017 Stockholm truck attack](#), Sweden (5 killed, 15 injured seriously).
- [2017 London Bridge attack](#) ramming and stabbing attack. (8 killed, 48 injured)
- [June 2017 Champs-Élysées car ramming attack, Paris](#), France (ramming a police car; 1 attacker killed)
- [2017 Levallois-Perret attack, Levallois-Perret](#), France (ramming soldiers; none killed)
- [2017 Barcelona attacks, Barcelona, Spain](#) (ramming, stabbing and bombings; 16 killed 152 injured)
- [2017 Charlottesville attack](#), during the Unite the Right rally in [Charlottesville, Virginia](#), United States (ramming people; 1 killed, 35 injured)
- [2017 Edmonton attack](#), Canada
- [2017 New York City truck attack](#), 8 killed and 13 injured.
- [2018 Mishui vehicle attack](#) China (15 dead, 43 injured)
- [2019 Tokyo car attack](#) (no fatalities, 9 injured)
- [2018 Toronto van attack](#) (ramming people; 11 killed and 15 injured)
- [2020 Paris car attack](#), a 29-year-old French-Moroccan driver who had pledged allegiance to [Islamic State](#) rammed his car into two police motorcyclists in a [Paris](#) suburb.
- [2021 Waukesha, Wisconsin Christmas parade attack](#), 39-year-old Darrell Brooks drove into a Christmas parade (6 killed and 62 injured).
- [2023 Ramot Junction attack](#) (3 killed, 4 injured)
- [2024 Zhuhai car attack](#), a 62-year-old man drove into a crowd outside sports center (35 killed and 43 injured).
- [2024 Changde car attack](#), a 39-year-old man drove into a crowd outside a primary school when students were going to school in the morning (30 injured including 18 students)^[43]
- [2024 Magdeburg car attack](#), a 50-year-old Saudi Arabian citizen who came to Germany in 2006 drove into a crowd at the [Magdeburg Christmas market](#) (at least 5 killed, 200+ injured)
- [2025 New Orleans truck attack](#), a man drove a vehicle into a crowd on New Year's Day at around 3 am (15 killed, 35 injured)^[46]

Terrorists Use Vehicles in 3 Main Ways

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive
Device (VBIED)

Vehicle As a Weapon (VAW)

Layered Attack Vehicle - transporting
attackers and/or weapons

VAW Attacks on the Rise

- Remotely inspiring operatives rather than recruiting them
- Requires little skill and little to no preparation/planning to perpetrate
- Less likely to be detected in planning phase
- Ease to target large crowds and outside gatherings
- Affordable
- Cars and trucks are widely available
 - Owned
 - Borrowed
 - Leased
 - Stolen
 - Hijacked
- Potential to cause significant casualties
- Insight fear, panic, and widespread alarm

Using Global Terrorism Database (Univ of Maryland)

- 78 attacks between 1973 – 2018
 - Focus was on specifically VAW to large crowds with no specific target
- 281 Deaths
- 1200 Injuries



Trends & Frequency




Figure 1: Vehicle Rammings Over Time, 1973-2017




Figure 2: Vehicle Ramming Lethality Over Time, 1973-2017



More frequent



More lethal



16 attacks between 1973 – 2007



62 attacks between 2008 - 2018

Global Prevalence

Table 3: Vehicle Attacks and Fatalities, by Country, in Order by Fatality Per Attack

Country	# Attacks	# Fatalities	FPA*
China	3	52	17.3
Haiti	2	18	9.0
France	10	88	8.8
Czechoslovakia	1	8	8.0
Spain	2	15	7.5
Germany	2	14	7.0
Netherlands	1	6	6.0
Canada	2	10	5.0
Australia	1	5	5.0
Sweden	2	7	3.5
United Kingdom	5	12	2.4
Israel	14	26	1.9
Austria	2	3	1.5
→ United States	13	12	0.9
West Bank and Gaza Strip	14	5	0.4
Belgium	1	0	0.0
Ireland	1	0	0.0
Japan	1	0	0.0
Sri Lanka	1	0	0.0
<i>Summary</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>281</i>	<i>3.6</i>

* Fatalities per attack.




Where are Attacks Occurring?

Table 11: Target Groups by Frequency of Attacks




Target Group	# Attacks	# Fatalities	FPA
Bus Stations or Stops	18	22	1.2
Public Streets - Vehicle Access	15	25	1.7
Public Streets - Pedestrianized	10	34	3.4
Public Gathering - Demonstration, Other	5	110	22.0
→ Medical Facility	4	0	0.0
Religious Institution (or Guards protecting them)	4	0	0.0
Public Gathering - Market (religious or open)	3	55	18.3
Public Streets - Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access	3	17	5.7
Train Stations and Stops	3	10	3.3
Buses	3	5	1.7
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street	3	2	0.7
Area outside Public Building	3	1	0.3
Entertainment	2	0	0.0
Public Road Infrastructure	1	0	0.0
Public Stores	1	0	0.0
<i>Summary</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>281</i>	<i>3.6</i>


* Fatalities per attack.

Terrorists Exploits to Overcome Security

	<p>Parked</p> <p>A vehicle may be parked close to an asset or inside the perimeter of a site or event space. The vehicle may be parked legitimately, illegally or without the land-owner or event organiser's consent. It may be deliberately parked repeatedly to create familiarity.</p> <p>The vehicle may be abandoned or remain occupied for a short or considerable amount of time prior to the time of attack.</p> <p>Unsecured parked vehicles within or outside a protected area may be utilised by the attackers.</p>
	<p>Encroachment</p> <p>A hostile vehicle may be able to exploit gaps in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• An urban/rural landscape or perimeter protection• Drive slowly through or over what is perceived to be a perimeter or series of obstructions• Closely tailgate a legitimate vehicle through a single layer Vehicle Access Control Point (VACP)
	<p>Penetrative</p> <p>A vehicle may be used at low or high speed to weaken and/or breach through security measures. A penetrative attack could result in an IED detonating in or close to an asset or a hostile vehicle entering a crowded place. Lower speed attacks may involve the vehicle being aggressively and repetitively rammed against security measures or other obstructions to gain access.</p>

Terrorists Exploits to Overcome Security

	<p>Deception</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Trojan Vehicle: The vehicle may be modified to replicate a legitimate vehicle. The vehicle may look familiar: make and model, registration number, livery.• The occupant(s) of a vehicle may use pretence to gain site access. The occupants may lie, or use forge/stolen documentation to gain access, use disguises to appear genuine or try to distract/confuse the security officer(s) to gain access.• Unknowing mule: a legitimate driver unknowingly delivers a hidden IED, firearms, weapons and/or attackers into a protected area.
	<p>Duress/Coercion</p> <p>A security officer at a Vehicle Access Control Point (VACP), a legitimate driver or other person could be forced to facilitate hostile access into a site. They or others known to them may be threatened with violence. They may be placed under undue influence through mental pressure e.g. bribery or blackmail.</p>
	<p>Insider</p> <p>A person with legitimate access willingly facilitates an attack by operating the security measures locally or remotely, managing or issuing access rights or tampering with the security measures.</p>
	<p>Tamper/Sabotage</p> <p>With the intent of leaving no evidence, this attack facilitates hostile vehicle access at a later time. This may involve altering, weakening, or disabling a barrier and/or associated security systems. This may be a physical or cyber attack that occurs gradually over time or immediately before an attack. An aggressive physical attack on the barriers at or just before may facilitate a fast-moving attack.</p>



Hostile Vehicle Mitigation

- Protective security discipline focusing on reducing risks associated with vehicle borne threats posed by terrorists and criminal
- Integrated deployment of security processes, procedures and physical obstructions to counter vehicle borne threats



Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Measures

- They include
 - Deterrent communications
 - Security awareness
 - Incident response planning and training
 - Operational security
 - Traffic management and the deployment of physical obstructions
 - Vehicle security barriers
 - Traffic calming measures.

Assess Strengths & Vulnerabilities of Your Site

- Develop detailed security requirements for HVM
- User Requirement Document (URD)
 - Addressing additional business needs e.g. stakeholder liaison, planning and design
- Practical site assessment
 - Vulnerabilities and opportunities in the environment, operational and physical security measures.
- Technical assessment
 - Vehicle Dynamics Assessment (VDA)
- Liaison with technical or security experts

Reducing Vulnerability

- Principles of hostile vehicle mitigation
 - Determine the aims of the HVM strategy and how it will integrate with other site security measures.
- Traffic calming
 - Used to limit vehicle approach speeds to a manageable level.
- Vehicle Security Barriers (VSB)
 - Provide proven vehicle impact protection and maintain blast stand-off.
- Traffic management –
 - When and how legitimate traffic will access the site.
- Vehicle access control
 - Consider deployment of active VSB solutions, access procedures, long term operational management and emergency access.




VEHICLE RAMMING SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOL OVERVIEW



The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) provides the critical infrastructure community with access to a Vehicle Ramming Self-Assessment Tool to evaluate potential vulnerabilities to a vehicle ramming attack. Leveraged as part of a comprehensive security strategy, the tool can inform cost-effective decision-making and support security capacity-building efforts. This is particularly important for public gathering locations and in preparation for special events.

The use of a vehicle as a weapon in an attack is not new. International and domestic violent extremists promote the use of vehicles as a weapon because it requires minimal capability and can have a devastating impact in crowded places. In many circumstances, there are few or no observable indicators, which makes detecting a potential vehicle ramming attack plot more difficult. **According to the Homeland Threat Assessment¹ published in October 2020 by the Department of Homeland Security, vehicle ramming remains among the more probable attack methods in the United States.**

Although there are currently no credible or imminent threats to critical infrastructure or special events, CISA recommends that owners / operators leverage the tool to determine potential vulnerabilities and identify corresponding risk mitigation solutions.



What is it?

The Vehicle Ramming Self-Assessment Tool is a web-based resource comprised of a series of simple questions that evaluate various components of a facility to assess potential vulnerabilities to a vehicle ramming attack. Based on responses, the tool provides recommended actions to reduce risk; it also includes access to a multitude of informational resources.

Does the tool collect my information?

The tool is a standalone, downloadable resource that does not collect or store users' information. Once downloaded, the tool is fully operational solely on the user's computer.

Can I save my data?

Users can export data several ways to help document a plan of action to address identified vulnerabilities.

How does the tool work?

The tool contains a series of questions relating to the location of a facility and its accessibility. As users input answers to simple questions, the tool generates risk ratings for each area of interest. A prioritization scale is leveraged to allow the user to address areas of most consequence in sequence. The tool also allows users to develop a risk mitigation strategy based on selected vulnerabilities and corresponding protective measures.

How can I access the tool?

Use the QR code or visit cisa.gov/vehicle-ramming-attack-mitigation to access the tool and other related resources.



¹ dhs.gov/publication/2020-homeland-threat-assessment

Coalition Updates

➤ Current Real-World Events

- International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) Strike
- IV Solution Shortage (Baxter)

➤ NJHCC.org Website Updates

➤ Supply Chain Integrity Assessment

➤ Jurisdictional Risk Assessment (JRA)

➤ Statewide Workplace Violence Committee Meetings

➤ Medical Response Surge Exercise (MRSE) Planning Group Meetings

➤ Primary Purposes

- To assess pre-hospital care, triage, and transportation capabilities
- To assess facility and regional medical patient surge plans
- To assess regional readiness and collaboration amongst healthcare agencies

➤ Tentative Exercise Timeframe: March 2025

➤ Workgroup Summary:

- Presently developing narrative, injects, and other elements
- Confirming exercise location



Statewide MRSE 25' Workgroup

Join the Workgroup Today!



 NEW JERSEY HEALTHCARE COALITIONS

Coalition Updates Continued

➤ National Healthcare Coalition Preparedness Conference (NHCPC) Update

➤ Upcoming Conferences

➤ Association of Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Professionals (AHEPP)

➤ New Jersey Emergency Preparedness Association (NJEPA) Conference

➤ NACCHO 2025 Preparedness Summit

➤ 2025 NJHCC Strategic Planning Meeting

Coalition Updates Continued

- National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) Dashboard – 01/11/2025



- Hazard Vulnerability Assessments (HVA) Update



Member Updates

- Acute Care
- LTC / Post-Acute
- FQHC
- Public Health
- OEM
- Home Care & Hospice
- EMS
- Behavioral/Mental Health



Reminders...

- The New Jersey HealthCare Coalition Emergency Management Support Team is always available 24/7 to assist with any item you may need such as...
- COOP Plan Development
- EOP Development
- NIMS Compliance
- Regulatory Information Gathering
- Cyber Assistance
- Current Industry Practice Information (“Colleague Questions”)

Upcoming Meeting Dates & Times

February 19th, 2025

8:30am – 4pm

NJHCC Strategic Planning Meeting
Location – Pines Manor in Edison, NJ

Tentatively March 20th, 2025

10am – 12pm

In-Person North HCC Meeting
Location – To Be Determined



Register Today!

NORTH REGION HEALTHCARE COALITION FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS

IF YOU HAVE TOPICS OR INFORMATION THAT YOU WOULD LIKE
REVIEWED / DISCUSSED, PLEASE REACH US AT:

rhcc@njha.com or [\(800\) 457-2262](tel:(800)457-2262)

OR VISIT OUR WEBSITE:

www.NJHCC.org

Post-Meeting Feedback Survey

- Please take this 2-3 minute survey to better prepare us for future HCC meetings

