

CENTRAL REGION HEALTHCARE COALITION MEETING

JANUARY 21ST, 2025

**Virtual Sign-in
Sheet**



CENTRAL HCC Leaders:
Scott Skrivanek & Robert “Bob” Field, Jr

Clinical Advisor:
Dr. Ammundeep Tagore

Agenda

- Welcome
- NJCICC Presentation
- Clinical Advisor Presentation
- Coalition Updates
- Coalition Discussions
- Member Updates
- Technical Support Reminder and Upcoming Meetings
- Closing Remarks




New Jersey Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cell



Clinical Advisor Updates



A close-up, low-angle shot of a vehicle's tire tread on a dirt road. The tire is the central focus, showing a rugged, blocky tread pattern. The background is blurred, showing a dirt road and some foliage. The overall tone is dark and gritty.

Vehicle as a Weapon (VAW) Attacks

Ammundeeep Tagore MD

New Year's Day Ramming in New Orleans

- Ford Truck used as VAW
- 15 Killed
- 35 Injured



History of Attacks

- 1973 [Olga Hepnarová case](#), Czechoslovakian woman using a truck to go on a rampage; 8 dead, 12 injured.
- 1983 [Douglas Crabbe](#) drove a 25-tonne [Mack truck](#) into the crowded bar of a motel at the base of [Uluru](#) on 18 August 1983. Five people were killed, and sixteen were seriously injured.
- 1999 [Shimonoseki Station massacre](#) (ramming and stabbing)
- [2001 Azor attack](#) (8 dead, 26 injured)
- 2004 Colorado USA [Marvin Heemeyer](#), aka KillDozer attack (severe property damage, perpetrator dead by suicide)
- [2006 UNC SUV attack](#), 22 year old Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar intentionally hit people with an SUV (no deaths, 9 injured)
- [2008 Jerusalem front-end loader attack](#) (3 killed, 30 injured)
- [2008 Jerusalem BMW attack](#) (19 injured)
- [2009 attack on the Dutch royal family](#) (ramming people, attempt to attack the Dutch royals including the reigning monarch; 8 killed)
- [2011 Tel Aviv truck attack](#)(1 dead, 17 injured)
- [2013 Tiananmen Square attack](#) (5 dead, 38 injured)
- [2014 Isla Vista killings](#) (vehicle ramming, stabbing, and shooting attack)
- [2014 Dijon attack](#), France (ramming people)
- [2014 Nantes attack](#), France (ramming people)
- [2014 Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu ramming attack](#), Quebec,Canada. (1 killed, 1 severely injured)
- 2014 [October 2014 Jerusalem vehicular attack](#) (one child, one adult killed,7 injured)
- 2014 [November 2014 Jerusalem vehicular attack](#) (3 dead, 13 wounded)
- [2014 Jerusalem tractor attack](#) (1 killed, 7 injured)
- [May 2014 Ürümqi attack](#) (43 dead, 90+ injured)
- 2015 [Saint-Quentin-Fallavier attack](#), France (ramming people, stabbing and bombings; 1 killed, 2 injured)
- 2015 Weifang attack (ramming people). 5 dead, 21 injured
- 2015 Shuozhou attack (ramming people)
- [2016 Nice truck attack](#), France (86 killed, ramming people and gunfire).
- [January 2017 Melbourne car attack](#), Australia, (6 killed, 28 injured, 1 stabbed before).
- [2017 Jerusalem truck attack](#) (4 dead, 17 injured)
- [2017 Finsbury Park van attack](#) (1 dead, 11 injured)
- [2017 Westminster attack](#) (6 dead, 48 injured)
- [2017 Stockholm truck attack](#), Sweden (5 killed, 15 injured seriously).
- [2017 London Bridge attack](#) ramming and stabbing attack. (8 killed, 48 injured)
- [June 2017 Champs-Élysées car ramming attack, Paris](#), France (ramming a police car; 1 attacker killed)
- [2017 Levallois-Perret attack, Levallois-Perret](#), France (ramming soldiers; none killed)
- [2017 Barcelona attacks, Barcelona, Spain](#) (ramming, stabbing and bombings; 16 killed 152 injured)
- [2017 Charlottesville attack](#), during the Unite the Right rally in [Charlottesville, Virginia](#), United States (ramming people; 1 killed, 35 injured)
- [2017 Edmonton attack](#), Canada
- [2017 New York City truck attack](#), 8 killed and 13 injured.
- [2018 Mishui vehicle attack](#) China (15 dead, 43 injured)
- [2019 Tokyo car attack](#) (no fatalities, 9 injured)
- [2018 Toronto van attack](#) (ramming people; 11 killed and 15 injured)
- [2020 Paris car attack](#), a 29-year-old French-Moroccan driver who had pledged allegiance to [Islamic State](#) rammed his car into two police motorcyclists in a [Paris](#) suburb.
- [2021 Waukesha, Wisconsin Christmas parade attack](#), 39-year-old Darrell Brooks drove into a Christmas parade (6 killed and 62 injured).
- [2023 Ramot Junction attack](#) (3 killed, 4 injured)
- [2024 Zhuhai car attack](#), a 62-year-old man drove into a crowd outside sports center (35 killed and 43 injured).
- [2024 Changde car attack](#), a 39-year-old man drove into a crowd outside a primary school when students were going to school in the morning (30 injured including 18 students)^[43]
- [2024 Magdeburg car attack](#), a 50-year-old Saudi Arabian citizen who came to Germany in 2006 drove into a crowd at the [Magdeburg Christmas market](#) (at least 5 killed, 200+ injured)
- [2025 New Orleans truck attack](#), a man drove a vehicle into a crowd on New Year's Day at around 3 am (15 killed, 35 injured)^[46]

Terrorists Use Vehicles in 3 Main Ways

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive
Device (VBIED)

Vehicle As a Weapon (VAW)

Layered Attack Vehicle - transporting
attackers and/or weapons

VAW Attacks on the Rise

- Remotely inspiring operatives rather than recruiting them
- Requires little skill and little to no preparation/planning to perpetrate
- Less likely to be detected in planning phase
- Ease to target large crowds and outside gatherings
- Affordable
- Cars and trucks are widely available
 - Owned
 - Borrowed
 - Leased
 - Stolen
 - Hijacked
- Potential to cause significant casualties
- Insight fear, panic, and widespread alarm

Using Global Terrorism Database (Univ of Maryland)

- 78 attacks between 1973 – 2018
 - Focus was on specifically VAW to large crowds with no specific target
- 281 Deaths
- 1200 Injuries



Trends & Frequency




Figure 1: Vehicle Rammings Over Time, 1973-2017




Figure 2: Vehicle Ramming Lethality Over Time, 1973-2017



More frequent



More lethal



16 attacks between 1973 – 2007



62 attacks between 2008 - 2018

Global Prevalence

Table 3: Vehicle Attacks and Fatalities, by Country, in Order by Fatality Per Attack

Country	# Attacks	# Fatalities	FPA*
China	3	52	17.3
Haiti	2	18	9.0
France	10	88	8.8
Czechoslovakia	1	8	8.0
Spain	2	15	7.5
Germany	2	14	7.0
Netherlands	1	6	6.0
Canada	2	10	5.0
Australia	1	5	5.0
Sweden	2	7	3.5
United Kingdom	5	12	2.4
Israel	14	26	1.9
Austria	2	3	1.5
→ United States	13	12	0.9
West Bank and Gaza Strip	14	5	0.4
Belgium	1	0	0.0
Ireland	1	0	0.0
Japan	1	0	0.0
Sri Lanka	1	0	0.0
<i>Summary</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>281</i>	<i>3.6</i>

* Fatalities per attack.




Where are Attacks Occurring?

Table 11: Target Groups by Frequency of Attacks





Target Group	# Attacks	# Fatalities	FPA
Bus Stations or Stops	18	22	1.2
Public Streets - Vehicle Access	15	25	1.7
Public Streets - Pedestrianized	10	34	3.4
Public Gathering - Demonstration, Other	5	110	22.0
→ Medical Facility	4	0	0.0
Religious Institution (or Guards protecting them)	4	0	0.0
Public Gathering - Market (religious or open)	3	55	18.3
Public Streets - Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access	3	17	5.7
Train Stations and Stops	3	10	3.3
Buses	3	5	1.7
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street	3	2	0.7
Area outside Public Building	3	1	0.3
Entertainment	2	0	0.0
Public Road Infrastructure	1	0	0.0
Public Stores	1	0	0.0
<i>Summary</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>281</i>	<i>3.6</i>


* Fatalities per attack.

Terrorists Exploits to Overcome Security

	<p>Parked</p> <p>A vehicle may be parked close to an asset or inside the perimeter of a site or event space. The vehicle may be parked legitimately, illegally or without the land-owner or event organiser's consent. It may be deliberately parked repeatedly to create familiarity.</p> <p>The vehicle may be abandoned or remain occupied for a short or considerable amount of time prior to the time of attack.</p> <p>Unsecured parked vehicles within or outside a protected area may be utilised by the attackers.</p>
	<p>Encroachment</p> <p>A hostile vehicle may be able to exploit gaps in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• An urban/rural landscape or perimeter protection• Drive slowly through or over what is perceived to be a perimeter or series of obstructions• Closely tailgate a legitimate vehicle through a single layer Vehicle Access Control Point (VACP)
	<p>Penetrative</p> <p>A vehicle may be used at low or high speed to weaken and/or breach through security measures. A penetrative attack could result in an IED detonating in or close to an asset or a hostile vehicle entering a crowded place. Lower speed attacks may involve the vehicle being aggressively and repetitively rammed against security measures or other obstructions to gain access.</p>

Terrorists Exploits to Overcome Security

	<p>Deception</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Trojan Vehicle: The vehicle may be modified to replicate a legitimate vehicle. The vehicle may look familiar: make and model, registration number, livery.• The occupant(s) of a vehicle may use pretence to gain site access. The occupants may lie, or use forge/stolen documentation to gain access, use disguises to appear genuine or try to distract/confuse the security officer(s) to gain access.• Unknowing mule: a legitimate driver unknowingly delivers a hidden IED, firearms, weapons and/or attackers into a protected area.
	<p>Duress/Coercion</p> <p>A security officer at a Vehicle Access Control Point (VACP), a legitimate driver or other person could be forced to facilitate hostile access into a site. They or others known to them may be threatened with violence. They may be placed under undue influence through mental pressure e.g. bribery or blackmail.</p>
	<p>Insider</p> <p>A person with legitimate access willingly facilitates an attack by operating the security measures locally or remotely, managing or issuing access rights or tampering with the security measures.</p>
	<p>Tamper/Sabotage</p> <p>With the intent of leaving no evidence, this attack facilitates hostile vehicle access at a later time. This may involve altering, weakening, or disabling a barrier and/or associated security systems. This may be a physical or cyber attack that occurs gradually over time or immediately before an attack. An aggressive physical attack on the barriers at or just before may facilitate a fast-moving attack.</p>



Hostile Vehicle Mitigation

- Protective security discipline focusing on reducing risks associated with vehicle borne threats posed by terrorists and criminal
- Integrated deployment of security processes, procedures and physical obstructions to counter vehicle borne threats



Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Measures

- They include
 - Deterrent communications
 - Security awareness
 - Incident response planning and training
 - Operational security
 - Traffic management and the deployment of physical obstructions
 - Vehicle security barriers
 - Traffic calming measures.

Assess Strengths & Vulnerabilities of Your Site

- Develop detailed security requirements for HVM
- User Requirement Document (URD)
 - Addressing additional business needs e.g. stakeholder liaison, planning and design
- Practical site assessment
 - Vulnerabilities and opportunities in the environment, operational and physical security measures.
- Technical assessment
 - Vehicle Dynamics Assessment (VDA)
- Liaison with technical or security experts

Reducing Vulnerability

- Principles of hostile vehicle mitigation
 - Determine the aims of the HVM strategy and how it will integrate with other site security measures.
- Traffic calming
 - Used to limit vehicle approach speeds to a manageable level.
- Vehicle Security Barriers (VSB)
 - Provide proven vehicle impact protection and maintain blast stand-off.
- Traffic management –
 - When and how legitimate traffic will access the site.
- Vehicle access control
 - Consider deployment of active VSB solutions, access procedures, long term operational management and emergency access.



VEHICLE RAMMING SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOL OVERVIEW



The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) provides the critical infrastructure community with access to a Vehicle Ramming Self-Assessment Tool to evaluate potential vulnerabilities to a vehicle ramming attack. Leveraged as part of a comprehensive security strategy, the tool can inform cost-effective decision-making and support security capacity-building efforts. This is particularly important for public gathering locations and in preparation for special events.

The use of a vehicle as a weapon in an attack is not new. International and domestic violent extremists promote the use of vehicles as a weapon because it requires minimal capability and can have a devastating impact in crowded places. In many circumstances, there are few or no observable indicators, which makes detecting a potential vehicle ramming attack plot more difficult. **According to the Homeland Threat Assessment¹ published in October 2020 by the Department of Homeland Security, vehicle ramming remains among the more probable attack methods in the United States.**

Although there are currently no credible or imminent threats to critical infrastructure or special events, CISA recommends that owners / operators leverage the tool to determine potential vulnerabilities and identify corresponding risk mitigation solutions.



What is it?

The Vehicle Ramming Self-Assessment Tool is a web-based resource comprised of a series of simple questions that evaluate various components of a facility to assess potential vulnerabilities to a vehicle ramming attack. Based on responses, the tool provides recommended actions to reduce risk; it also includes access to a multitude of informational resources.

Does the tool collect my information?

The tool is a standalone, downloadable resource that does not collect or store users' information. Once downloaded, the tool is fully operational solely on the user's computer.

Can I save my data?

Users can export data several ways to help document a plan of action to address identified vulnerabilities.

How does the tool work?

The tool contains a series of questions relating to the location of a facility and its accessibility. As users input answers to simple questions, the tool generates risk ratings for each area of interest. A prioritization scale is leveraged to allow the user to address areas of most consequence in sequence. The tool also allows users to develop a risk mitigation strategy based on selected vulnerabilities and corresponding protective measures.

How can I access the tool?

Use the QR code or visit cisa.gov/vehicle-ramming-attack-mitigation to access the tool and other related resources.



¹ dhs.gov/publication/2020-homeland-threat-assessment

Thank you!

Questions?



Coalition Updates

- Current Real-World Events
 - International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) Strike
 - IV Solution Shortage (Baxter)
- NJHCC.org Website Updates
- Supply Chain Integrity Assessment
- Jurisdictional Risk Assessment (JRA)
- Statewide Workplace Violence Committee Meetings
- Medical Response Surge Exercise (MRSE) Planning Group Meetings

➤ Primary Purposes

- To assess pre-hospital care, triage, and transportation capabilities
- To assess facility and regional medical patient surge plans
- To assess regional readiness and collaboration amongst healthcare agencies

➤ Exercise Date:

➤ **03.11.2025**

➤ Venue:

➤ Virtual – Statewide



The graphic features a dark blue background with a blurred image of an audience. In the top left, the New Jersey Healthcare Coalitions logo is displayed. The main title 'MRSE FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE 2025' is centered in large white letters. To the right, a green circle contains the text 'Save the Date!', followed by the date 'Tuesday, March 11th' and the subtitle 'Statewide Virtual Functional Exercise'. Below this, the text 'REGISTER TODAY' is written in bold white letters, with a QR code underneath. At the bottom, contact information is provided: 'For more information: +1-800-457-2262 or RHCC@NJHA.com'.

NEW JERSEY
HEALTHCARE COALITIONS

Save the Date!

Tuesday,
March 11th

Statewide Virtual
Functional Exercise

**REGISTER
TODAY**

For more information: +1-800-457-2262 or RHCC@NJHA.com

Coalition Updates Continued

➤ National Healthcare Coalition Preparedness Conference (NHCPC) Update

➤ Upcoming Conferences

➤ Association of Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Professionals (AHEPP)

➤ New Jersey Emergency Preparedness Association (NJEPA) Conference

➤ NACCHO 2025 Preparedness Summit

➤ 2025 NJHCC Strategic Planning Meeting

Coalition Updates Continued

- National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) Dashboard



- Hazard Vulnerability Assessments (HVA) Update



Member Updates

- Acute Care
- Assisted Living/LTC / Post-Acute
- FQHC
- Public Health
- OEM
- Home Care & Hospice
- EMS
- Behavioral/Mental Health



Reminders...

- The New Jersey HealthCare Coalition Emergency Management Support Team is always available 24/7 to assist with any item you may need such as...
- COOP Plan Development
- EOP Development
- NIMS Compliance
- Regulatory Information Gathering
- Cyber Assistance
- Current Industry Practice Information (“Colleague Questions”)

Upcoming Meeting Dates & Times

February 19th, 2025

8:30am – 4pm

NJHCC Strategic Planning Meeting
Location – Pines Manor in Edison, NJ



Register Today!

Tentatively March 24th, 2025

10am – 12pm

In-Person Central HCC Meeting
Location – To Be Determined

CENTRAL REGION HEALTHCARE COALITION

FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS

IF YOU HAVE TOPICS OR INFORMATION THAT YOU WOULD LIKE
REVIEWED / DISCUSSED, PLEASE REACH US AT:

rhcc@njha.com or [\(800\) 457-2262](tel:(800)457-2262)

OR VISIT OUR WEBSITE:

www.NJHCC.org

Post-Meeting Feedback Survey

- Please take this 2-3 minute survey to better prepare us for future HCC meetings

